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REVIEW ESSAY 
Gender Justice and Its Critics 
GENDER JUSTICE. By David L. Kirp, t Mark G. Yudof,t & Marlene 
S. Franks.tt Univ. of Chicago Press 1986. 
Reviewed by Neal Devins* 
Four years ago, two essays that I authored on school desegregation 
were published at approximately the same time. The first argued that 
one must consider community desires as well as legal principle when 
fashioning a desegregation remedy. 1 The other criticized the Reagan 
Department of Justice for misinterpreting Supreme Court doctrine in this 
area.2 A short time after each piece was published, I confronted one of 
the harsh realities of working on such a highly charged topic: People not 
only care, they take it personally. Acquaintances on both extremes of the 
political spectrum shunned me. While liberals thought my "community 
desires" article validated racism, conservatives considered my Justice 
Department piece an overt attack on the administration. 
David Kirp, Mark Yudof, and Marlene Strong Franks, the authors 
of Gender Justice, are probably undergoing a shnilar experience. Over 
the past two years, their book has been harshly criticized by reviewers in 
the Georgetown Law Journal, 3 the Yale Law Journal, 4 the Texas Law 
t Professor in The Graduate School of Public Policy and Lecturer in The School of Law at 
The University of California, Berkeley. 
t Dean, University of Texas Law School and holder of The James A. Elkins Centennial 
Chair in Law. 
U Policy Analyst completing her Ph.D. in public policy at The University of California, 
Berkeley. 
• Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, 
Vanderbilt Law School. I would like to thank Ruth Calker, Alan Fuchs, Bob Fullinwider, Paul 
LeBel, and Lois Weithorn for their comments on an earlier draft. All mistakes are my own. A 
summer research grant from the College of William and Mary helped support my work on this 
essay. 
1. Devins, Integration and Local Politics (Book Review), 73 PuB. INT. 175 (Fall 1983). 
2. Devins, Closing the Classroom Door on Civil Rights, 11 HUM. RTS. 26 (Winter 1984). 
3. Burns, Apologia for the Status Quo (Book Review), 74 GEO. L.J. 1791 (1986). 
4. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice (Book Review), 
96 YALE L.J. 914 {1987). 
1377 
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Review, 5 and the Berkeley Women's Law Journal. 6 No positive scholarly 
criticism has yet been published. 7 
Why the negative reviews? Is the book so terrible that it should be 
panned? I think not. I find Gender Justice, while not faultless, reason-
able and well done. Its critics, I think, have decided to kill the messenger 
because they don't like the message, namely, that ·~ustice means enhanc-
ing choice for individuals, securing fair process rather than particular 
outcomes for the community" (p. 12). The book's "liberty-enhancing 
model"8 surely does not sit well with those who perceive that freedom of 
choice is impossible for many members of society. Indeed, the principal 
concern of the reviewers has been to demonstrate the model's failure to 
respond adequately to pervasive gender inequality. 
I do not dispute the feminists'9 critiques of the liberty-enhancing 
model. 10 At the same time, I think the feminist reviews of Gender Justice 
are unfair; they attack the book largely for what it is not, and thus over-
look many of the authors' valuable insights. 11 This review attempts a 
more equitable approach by placing the book and its critics in the larger 
context of feminist jurisprudence. In so doing, it assesses the book's suc-
cess in advancing a coherent model of gender equality. 
My purpose then is not to advance the liberty-enhancing model as 
the answer to all gender questions. Rather, I will evaluate the book's 
application of that model and demonstrate that it provides a useful and 
invigorating way to examine gender classifications. In the end, however, 
I find the book stimulating yet disappointing. While the book provides a 
5. Fishkin, Libeny and Sexual Equality (Book Review), 65 TEX. L. REV. 1441 (1987). 
6. Menkel-Meadow, Gendered Justice (Book Review), 2 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 258 
(1986). 
7. Gender Justice has fared somewhat better in the popular press. See Schwarzschild, Liberty 
and Autonomy for All, N.Y. Times, June IS, 1986, § 7 (Book Review), at 27. But see Gordon, 
Feminist Rhetoric and Academic Skirmishes, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1986, (Bookworld), at 10; Tong, 
Liberty. Equality- Community? (Book Review), WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, Jan. 1986, at I. 
8. The liberty-enhancing model deviates somewhat from the classic liberal vision of the 
nineteenth century. For example, the authors at one point argue that "[i]n a just world, we would 
not only remove baniers but also give support, for liberty has no appeal when it promises only the 
freedom to starve" (p. 21). 
9. Throughout this review, I refer to the ever-growing and diverse body of feminist 
jurisprudence. See infra notes 17-75 and accompanying text. Occasionally, however, I use the 
generic phrase "feminists." I do so not to describe feminism as a single way of thinking, but rather 
to contrast that wide-ranging body that constitutes feminist thinking with those who disagree with 
all feminists. 
10. This is not to say that I agree with these feminist interpretations. Instead, I think that one 
need not repudiate this vision to find Gender Justice worthwhile. 
11. Rather than consider Gender Justice on its own terms and evaluate the book within the 
context of the liberty-enhancing model, the reviewers focus their criticisms on the authors' equation 
of justice with choice and fair process. Nevertheless, many of the reviewers' narrow criticisms are 
well taken, particularly those expressed by Lucinda Finley. See Finley, supra note 4; see also infra 
notes 78-109. 
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provocative conceptual framework to explore gender issues, the authors' 
endorsement of liberalism-and with it the foundations underlying their 
liberty-enhancing model-ultimately is superficial. 
This review is divided into four Parts. Part I describes Gender Jus-
tice's liberty-enhancing model. Part II considers the book's place in fem-
inist thought. Part III evaluates the feminist criticisms of the book. 
Finally, Part IV presents my assessment of the book. 
. I 
GENDER JUSTICE DESCRIBED12 
When it comes to gender, activists on both the left and the right 
believe that government should play an instrumental role in implement-
ing their particular vision of social justice. On the right, naturalists con-
sider gender-specific identities a biological imperative and advocate the 
use of government resources to encourage traditional sex roles (pp. 53-
57). On the left, the more politically active feminists seek government-
mandated equality (of earnings, of childrearing, and other familial 
responsibilities) to overcome pernicious sexism (pp. 48-53, 58-61). 
These extreme visions mischaracterize differences in status and 
treatment between men and women (pp. 61-65). Nevertheless, gender-
related policies often advance one of these visions. Denial of federal 
abortion funds and the marital tax deduction further the naturalist model 
(pp. 108-11). Maternity leave requirements and comparable worth pro-
posals advance the feminist vision (pp. 168, 190). The viability of these 
policies exemplifies the central dilemma in this area-the perception that 
the status of women is explained by either biology or discrimination and 
acquiescence to biologically defined gender roles. 
Gender Justice seeks to solve this dilemma. Rather than supporting 
social outcomes based on paradigms rooted in the belief that either biol-
ogy or sexism defines women's role in society, Gender Justice stresses the 
primacy of self-determination. 13 The authors' view is that "justice means 
enhancing choice for individuals .... " (p. 12). Consequently, the 
authors generally endorse public policies that either protect or encourage 
free choice, while criticizing those policies designed to produce particular 
outcomes. 
The authors premise their embrace of the liberty-enhancing model 
on the belief that "[i]ndividuals can usually best decide what is in their 
best interests, because they are the ones with the greatest incentives to 
12. For a fuller description of the book, see Finley, supra note 4, at 914-23. 
13. A healthy dose of distrust of governmental intervention is closely tied to this embrace of 
liberty-enhancing public policy. For -example, in rejecting feminist proposals to have government 
transform gender roles, the authors argue that "[w)hat is remarkable about this litany is the implicit 
expectation that anyone, let alone government, might accomplish all those things ..• " (p. 125). 
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weigh highly personalized costs and benefits." (p. 21). Their model is 
consistent with the principle of equal opportunity, which holds that per-
sons of equal ability and motivation should have equal chances to achieve 
their personal life plans (pp. 22, 105). 14 Viewed in the abstract, men and 
women must be deemed similarly situated since both are capable of 
choice. As a result, the authors argue that men and women should have 
the freedom to make choices and exercise opportunities without regard 
to gender. 
In arguing for gender-neutral policies, the authors emphasize that 
individual choice and ability are instrumental in determining outcomes. 
Consequently, result-oriented feminists are wrong to conclude that free-
dom of choice alone does not lead to just results. Contending that "vari-
ations between the sexes are attributable, not just to noxious 
discrimination, but also to factors such as personal taste and voluntary 
obligations" (p. 27), the authors criticize result-oriented feminists: "To 
insist ... that a world where some women stay in their homes and raise 
children is an unjust world implies that those women have made the 
wrong choice . . . . [O]n what moral basis can anyone stand outside as 
judge, condemning the mothers for their decision?" (p. 22). 
Like the outcome-based ideologies it criticizes, however, Gender 
Justice proceeds on a conception of women in society. In advancing the 
free-choice model, the authors underscore the traditional treatment and 
current condition of women, including a discussion of the historic segre-
gation of women in public policy. Using as examples both protective 
labor laws (mandating minimum wages and maximum work periods) and 
laws specifying that husbands administer their wives' assets, they con-
clude that "women were victimized by policies designed to protect 
them-policies that, for this very reason, denied them the chance to 
make basic decisions for themselves" (p. 29). The authors emphasize 
that, in contrast to such "benevolent" legislation, remedial acts such as 
the prohibition of sex-based discrimination in employment contained in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act15 and the Equal Pay Act16 have enabled 
women to make substantial inroads in the male-dominated marketplace 
(pp. 158, 171). Although acknowledging that discrimination still con-
tributes to the earnings gap between men and women, Gender Justice 
concludes that discrimination is less significant than in the past and is but 
one of many sociological factors affecting gender equality (pp. 142-53). 
The authors, as noted, do not dismiss the wage gap. They note that 
14. According to the authors, "[h]onoring individual choice ultimately enables the individual 
to define his or her own identity in one of its most fundamental aspects" (p. 22). See also Bell, On 
Meritocracy and Equality, 29 PUB. INT. 29 (1972). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). 
16. 29 u.s.c. § 206 (1985). 
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past discriminatory practices and employee choice have created "distinct 
career lines with different rewards for men and women" (p. 145), and 
thus they advocate government leadership in developing recruitment and 
training programs to encourage women to enter male-dominated profes-
sions (p. 165).17 Unlike quotas-which in their view treat individuals as 
interchangeable units-such programs recognize the primacy of individ-
ual autonomy (p. 136). 18 These programs would ensure that men and 
women are treated equally in the public sphere of work and commuuity 
(pp. 166-72). With respect to the private sphere of home and family, 
Gender Justice asserts that government generally should not interfere 
with private choices (pp. 81, 201). 19 
Using individual liberty as a benchmark, the authors consider many 
other gender-related issues, including sex-based variances in the compu-
tation of actuarial tables (acceptable because they reflect a biological tru-
ism) (pp. 3-4), the marital tax deduction (unacceptable because it 
rewards the traditional family at the expense of alternative family 
arrangements) (pp. 186-90), the abolition of gender-specific minimum 
wage laws (acceptable because it protects a woman's right to compete 
equally for jobs) (p. 119), and the exclusion of women from draft regis-
tration (unacceptable because women and men should be equally obli-
gated to defend the nation) (pp. 104-05). Because the authors' principal 
inquiry is whether choice is unjustifiably restricted, Gender Justice is able 
to move quickly from issue to issue. 
Gender Justice's liberty-enhancing model differs substantially from 
Supreme Court approaches to sex discrimination. Since 1976, the Court 
has applied so-called "middle tier" review to gender-based distinctions, 
requiring that such policies "must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives."20 When applying this standard, however, the Court has often 
adopted a deterministic vision of gender equality and insisted that gen-
17. Similarly, the authors support programs encouraging men to enter traditionally female 
professions. Gender Justice offers the following model for effective gender-based policy: "Removing 
the formal impediments to volition, securing the basic requisites of choice, [and] encouraging 
tolerance for the divergent choices of others ... will lead to change" (p. 28). 
18. The authors state that "quotas withhold from individuals the right of self-determination 
that is critical for self-respect" (p. 136). 
19. According to the authors, "[t]he public sphere is the world of political and economic 
affairs, the private sphere refers to relationships in which personal satisfactions or interests, not the 
public good, are determinative" (p. 17). 
20. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma law prohibiting sale of 
beer to males under 21, while permitting such sales to 18-year-old females). See generally Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 20-37 (1972) (explaining the Court's 
abandonment of a two-tier model of equal protection doctrine by adding an intermediate or "middle 
tier" approach in the early 1970s). 
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der-based classifications conform to perceived biological differences.21 
Thus, male-only draft registration is appropriate because Congress has 
determined that women are physically disadvantaged and therefore 
should be ineligible for combat duty.22 Similarly, criminalizing sexual 
relations with a minor female, but not a minor male, correctly recognizes 
that women and men are "not similarly situated with respect to the 
problems and risks of sexual intercourse.'m In commenting on this nat-
uralist emphasis on real sex differences, Anne Freedman has written: 
"The adjective 'real' implies not only that these differences are caused by 
nature or biology, but also that the impact of sex differences on people's 
lives is natural and inevitable, rather than culturally determined. "24 
The Court's validation of special treatment programs endorsed by 
many feminists appears equally deterministic. An example is its recent 
approval of a qualified right to reinstatement in conjunction with unpaid 
pregnancy leave. 25 While emphasizing that "a State could not mandate 
special treatment of pregnant workers based on stereotypes or generaliza-
tions about their needs and abilities,"26 the Court upheld a law allowing 
female employees up to four months to recover from childbirth. 27 
Undoubtedly, the allowance for such extended leave was premised on the 
view that women-but not men-need a sufficient period of time to reor-
ganize their lives as parents and workers. The Court's special treatment 
of women has been attacked by some scholars as reinforcing the cultural 
norm of women as homemakers. Professor Wendy Williams, for exam-
ple, criticizes "feminists who seek special recognition for pregnancy,"28 
since "[m]aternity leave was always based upon cultural constructs and 
ideologies rather than upon biological necessity, upon role expectations 
rather than irreducible differences between the sexes."29 
21. See generally Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE 
L.J. 913, 922-43 (1983) (tracing concept of "real" sex differences in Rehnquist-Stewart approach). 
22. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) ("'The principle that women should not 
intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental. .. .' ") (quoting S. REP. No. 826, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1980)). 
23. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981). 
24. Freedman, supra note 21, at 945. 
25. See California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987) (upholding 
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act). 
26. Id. at 691 n.17. 
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). But cj Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. 
Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987) (state may disqualify unemployment compensation 
claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, because the statutory coverage excludes all 
claimants who leave their jobs for reasons not causally connected to their work or their employers). 
See generally Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 38-43 (1987) (arguing 
that Wimberly was based on a male standard whereas California Federal did not rely on gender-
based presumptions). 
28. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 
WoMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 195 (1982) [hereinafter Williams, The Equality Crisis]. 
29. Id. at 197. 
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Gender Justice is highly critical of so-called naturalist and feminist 
visions. In order to depart from deterministic se~-·stereotyping, the 
authors suggest that the Court adopt a two-part test in which it consid-
ers: (1) whether a gender-based classification serves to sustain autonomy 
or reduce liberty by maintaining historical distinctions; and (2) whether 
there exists a less gender-specific alternative (p. 101).30 
One of the most striking features of this liberty-enhancing model is 
the authors' recognition that gender-based policy no longer can ignore 
classifications that are harmful to men. They advocate the father's right 
to be informed of the mother's wish for an abortion (p. 111), the right of 
husbands to be eligible for alimony (p. 102), and the impropriety of the 
presumption-sometimes used in custody battles-that the mother is 
better able to care for her child than is the father (pp. 183-85). 
By applying the free-choice model equally to men and women, the 
authors also distinguish gender justice from racial justice. Contrasting 
the paternalistic "benefit motivation" of gender-based classifications with 
the invidious oppression of blacks by whites, they argue that their analy-
sis should not be applied to racial policy (p. 87).31 With respect to race, 
"where 'different' is almost always a euphemism for 'worse' " (p. 87), 
equality means indistinguishability. In contrast, Kirp, Yudof, and 
Franks consider indistinguishability a poor formula for gender equality. 
Their preferred constitutional approach treats gender equality "as secur-
ing equal liberty and equal rights of public participation for men and 
women" (p. 87). 
While preferring that government perform a limited role in trans-
forming gender roles, Gender Justice does not repudiate state involve-
ment. The authors recognize that government "cannot avoid affecting 
men's and women's choices" (p. 129); however, they advance a host of 
reform proposals designed to reduce government-imposed gender distinc-
tions. These include providing federal funds for childcare to give parents 
flexibility in selecting the appropriate mix between work and home (pp. 
190-94) and the adoption of an individually based tax system that does 
30. In applying this equal liberty principle, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks take issue with numerous 
Supreme Court decisions. Noting that women can at least carry out noncombat duty, they dispute 
the holding ofRostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), because it signifies women's diminished civic 
role (pp. 104-05). The authors' criticism is not confined to case outcomes, but extends equally to the 
Court's reasoning. Consequently, they take issue with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), a 
case insisting on sexually diverse jury rolls because "a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is 
excluded." Id. at 532. The authors argue that the case turned on stereotypical gender differences: 
The Court inappropriately emphasized the "distinct quality" of women, rather than premising its 
decision on civic responsibility as an essential element of liberty and respect (pp. 103-04). 
31. Indeed, the authors suggest that greater government intervention may be necessary to 
overcome the consequences of historic racial discrimination (p. 137). 
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not encourage certain types of familial relationships over others (pp. 186-
90).32 
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks never insist, however, that the government 
remain completely gender neutral. They endorse "benign" discrimina-
tion when it is truly remedial and thus liberty enhancing. Accordingly, 
Social Security Act provisions favoring women are permissible because 
they respond to historic discrimination that reduced women's earnings 
and forced them into early retirement (pp. 102-03). 33 The authors also 
advocate differences in treatment which respond to biological sex differ-
ences. Unlike the Supreme Court's approach, which permits gender dis-
tinctions substantially related to important government objectives, 
Gender Justice's authors would permit nonremedial distinctions only 
when based on immutable sex differences. For example, the computation 
of actuarial tables may take into account statistical disparities between 
the life expectancies of men and women (p. 114). In contrast, sex-based 
variances in auto insurance rates are rejected because such "[s]ex-based 
differentials create categories from which careful men cannot escape and 
which benefit reckless women" (p. 114). 
The authors are not uncompromising in their emphasis on choice. 
They apparently approve of some gender classifications in the name of 
fiscal expedience. This exception assumes that if a sexual stereotype is 
almost universally true, reliance upon it will not be demeaning. For 
example, in determining whether wives-but not husbands-are given 
military dependents' benefits without proof of their dependence, the 
authors view as a toss-up the conflicting concerns of administrative con-
venience (since the husband is chief breadwinner in almost ninety percent 
of military households) and sexual stereotyping (since such presumptions 
reinforce women's status as secondary wage earners) (p. 115). 
II 
GENDER JUSTICE AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
Gender Justice pays little attention to the burgeoning body of femi-
nist jurisprudence. 34 Instead, the authors debunk two jurisprudential 
32. The authors also propose modifying social security retirement benefits to recognize 
women's dual responsibilities at home and in the market (pp. 195-99). 
33. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). The authors also support sex-
based classifications in education, arguing that sex-segregated schools often enhance choice. The 
authors therefore disagree with a 1982 Supreme Court ruling which required a state-run nursing 
school to admit men. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Contending 
that the real issue is the impact of the school admission policy on plaintiff's life choices, the authors 
feel that the majority erred in its absolutist view that such sex-segregation "perpetuate[s] the 
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." !d. at 729 (p. 106). 
34. Several critics have attacked the book for presenting an oversimplistic view of feminist 
thinking. See Burns, supra note 3, at 1793 ("The authors virtually ignore the more interesting and 
productive source of contrasts and comparisons available in emerging feminist legal theory .•.. "); 
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caricatures-"naturalists" and "leftist feminists." This oversimplifica-
tion serves the authors well. Their purpose is not to offer a comprehen-
sive critique of thinking on gender policy, but rather to contrast their 
liberty-enhancing theory with deterministic visions on both extremes of 
the political spectrum. 35 Some understanding of the richness of feminist 
thinking, however, is necessary to appreciate Gender Justice and its crit-
ics. Three approaches dominate feminist thinking: equality, special 
treatment, and inequality.36 This Part separately considers each of these 
models. 
A. Equality 
The equality approach most closely resembles the liberty-enhancing 
model advanced in Gender Justice. Grounded in mid-seventies efforts to 
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment37 and push for heightened judicial 
review in gender cases, equality proponents speak of "the nation's moral 
and legal commitment to a system in which women and men stand as full 
see also Finley, supra note 4, at 915 ("[T]he work seems barely touched by the recent profusion of 
feminist writings on gender issues."). 
35. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks argue that the common underlying weakness of naturalist and 
leftist feminist paradigms is that they "stress what happens to women, rather than attributing to 
them any significant part in shaping their circumstances" (p. 63). 
36. See generally Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the 
Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1142-63 (1986) (summarizing the equality/special 
treatment debate in the context of critiquing equality theory); Note, Childbearing and Childrearing: 
Feminists and Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 1145 (1987) (examining the theoretical debate over social 
policies). Other feminist perspectives include antisubordination, equal acceptance, and 
communitarian theories. See Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 
61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986) (antisubordination); Littleton, Restructuring Sexual Equality, 75 
CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (equal acceptance); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) (communitarian). 
Many feminists also subscnbe to Carol Gilligan's notion that gender defines the approaches 
taken by men and women to resolve moral and legal problems. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE (1982). Those promoting this feminist approach, known as the "ethic of care," seek "a 
community and a judiciary that relies on nurturant, caring, loving, empathic values rather than 
exclusively on the rule of reason ...• " West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 65 
(1988); see also Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms? (Book Review), 75 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1559, 1568 (1987) (arguing that an ethic of care methodology "supplants the formal and 
abstract thinking entailed in the liberal ethic of justice and rights with an approach to moral 
problems that is contextual and narrative"). While feminists like Bartlett, Sherry, and West make 
use of Gilligan's theory, other feminists worry that the attnlmtes of the ethic of care are male-defined 
and hence capable of serving as a "mechanism for keeping women from true knowledge or good 
theory by limiting them to 'feminine' modes of discourse." Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Policies of Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 243 (1988); 
see a/so C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987) (Gilligan's theory reinforces women's 
powerlessness). 
37. The substantive section of the Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex." H.R.J. 
Res. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1983); S.J. Res. 10, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 129 CoNG. REC. 
5529-30 (1983). 
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and equal individuals under the law."38 Its chief contemporary propo-
nent is Professor Wendy Williams. According to Williams, "sex-based 
generalizations are generally impermissible whether derived from physi-
cal differences such as size and strength, from cultural role assignments 
such as breadwinner or homemaker, or from some combination of innate 
and ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of the average 
woman compared to the average man."39 In language strikingly similar 
to that in Gender Justice, she claims that "a dual system of rights inevita-
bly produces gender hierarchy and, more fundamentally, treats women 
and men as statistical abstractions rather than as persons with individual 
capacities, inclinations and aspirations-at enormous cost to women and 
not insubstantial cost to men."40 Consequently, Williams fears that the 
state may "lay claim to an interest in women's special procreational 
capacity"41 and thus argues against special rules for pregnancy-related 
disabilities.42 Instead, she advocates comprehensive disability plans that 
provide equally for men and women. By refusing to label early childrear-
ing as an exclusively feminine domain, Williams hopes to encourage 
greater male involvement in childrearing.43 
Gender Justice similarly views special maternity benefits as "the lat-
est version of paternalism, with all its debilitating consequences for work-
ing women" (p. 41). However, the book's formulation departs 
substantially from that offered by Williams. Whereas Williams insists 
that any rule having a disparate effect on one sex be reasonably necessary 
to business operations,44 Kirp, Yudof, and Franks suggest no such limi-
tation when disparate impact is rooted in choice. In the case of preg-
nancy, application of the liberty-enhancing model is not necessarily 
inconsistent with gender-based classifications, since "[u]nlike other disa-
38. Ginsberg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1915 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 
24. These mid-seventies litigation efforts-undertaken principally by the American Civil Liberties 
Union-"sought to show that women were similarly situated, but that society had treated them 
differently because of stereotypical 'old notions' and 'archaic assumptions' about sex roles." Cole, 
Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 33, 
55 (1984). See also Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the 
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 603-15 (defending the ideals of equality theorists) (1977). 
39. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment 
Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. i... & Soc. CHANGE 325, 329 (1984-1985) [hereinafter Williams, Equality's 
Riddle]. 
40. Id. at 329-30. 
41. Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at'l96. 
42. ld. Professor Williams further justifies her position by arguing that: (1) treating pregnancy 
as a special case allows for both unfavorable and favorable treatment; (2) focusing on pregnancy 
draws attention away from the larger concern of reforming disability programs; and (3) favorable 
treatment of pregnancy increases the costs of hiring women and therefore may ultimately harm 
women's economic position. Id. 
43. See Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 39, at 354-55. 
44. See id. at 331-32 (following approach of disparate-impact title VII analysis). 
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bilities ... pregnancy is usually voluntary and welcomed .... " (p. 109).45 
Moreover, Gender Justice's liberty-enhancing model also differs from the 
Williams' disparate-impact model by accepting gender-based rules rooted 
in administrative convenience or alleged natural sex differences.46 
B. Special Treatment 
Gender Justice departs more substantially from the work of special 
treatment feminists Herma Hill Kay and Sylvia Law~ Professor Kay 
argues that biological, reproductive sex differences should be legally sig-
nificant only in the context of procreation-related activities.47 For Kay, 
equality analysis "does not adequately solve the legal problems raised by 
reproductive differences, primarily because the comparison between men 
and women does not fit those cases."48 As a result, she endorses gender-
specific laws that require the granting of extended maternity leave, 
because such laws ensure equal employment opportunity by recognizing 
immutable differences between men and women. 49 For similar reasons, 
Kay implies that equality analysis fails in cases involving printed warn-
ings on cigarette packages about the dangers of smoking during preg-
nancy, court orders that safeguard fetal development against maternal 
neglect, and access to abortions by indigent women. so 
Professor Law's model varies slightly from Kay's approach in that it 
concentrates solely on laws impeding female reproductive freedom. 51 
Rather than having courts limit special treatment to instances where 
there are procreation-related differences between men and women, Pro-
fessor Law-apparently unconcerned with laws impeding male reproduc-
45. The authors do recognize, however, that complicated childbirth operations, as contrasted 
with the costs of normal pregnancy which "the ordinary family" can plan for, should be included in 
disability plans (p. 109). 
46. For an equality-based criticism of these features of the liberty-enhancing model, see infra 
notes 101-107 and accompanying text. 
47. Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1, 22 
(1985) [hereinafter Kay, Equality and Difference}. Professor Kay argues that "biological 
reproductive sex differences are not comparable to other traits or characteristics that are shared by 
both sexes, and cannot adequately be analyzed within a framework that turns on differential 
treatment of two comparable groups." /d. at 33. Consequently, she proposes conceptualizing the 
debate in terms of an "episodic analysis" which limits the legal significance of reproductive sex 
differences to pregnancy. /d. 
48. Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 87 [hereinafter Kay, Models of 
Equality}. The special treatment model is comparable to die equality approach in its treatment of 
risks to fertility that men and women share equally, such as exposure to toxic materials. According 
to Kay, such risks do not justify differences in treatment. /d. at 85. 
49. Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 47, at 20-38. For the equality critique of this 
proposition, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
SO. Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 83-84. 
51. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984)(arguing for 
a stronger focus on biological reproductive differences). . 
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tive freedom52-proposes that courts reviewing the constitutionality of 
laws governing reproductive biology53 ensure that "(1) the law has no 
significant impact in perpetuating either the oppression of women or cul-
turally imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom or (2) if the 
law has this impact, it is justified as the best means of serving a compel-
ling state purpose."54 In advancing her proposal, Law emphasizes the 
judiciary's inability to distinguish between biology and its accompanying 
social consequences. 55 
By viewing pregnancy as "voluntary," Gender Justice's liberty-
enhancing model is not sympathetic to the underlying concern of special 
treatment advocates. Like the equality theorists, Kirp, Yudof, and 
Franks view gender-based maternity leave as harmful paternalism (p. 
140). At the same time, the liberty-enhancing model recognizes that 
Congress should provide funds for medically necessary abortions when 
government offers "men and women every other kind of medically essen-
tial treatment" (p. 11 0). 56 Finally, Gender Justice is not insensitive to the 
needs of working mothers, but-like the equality model-its proposed 
solution is to offer parental benefits to both men and women. 
It is important to note that the liberty-enhancing, equality, and spe-
cial treatment models all share a strong belief in individual decisionmak-
ing. 57 The ultimate objective of all models is to ensure the fair treatment 
of men and women in the public sphere. 58 While the special treatment 
model is built around the special circumstances of pregnancy, it is gener-
ally highly critical of gender-based decisionmaking. Indeed, Professor 
Law refuses to extend her model beyond reproductive biology-believing 
instead that constitutional adjudication in this area should simply seek 
52. See Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 84-85 (discussing Law's method for 
analyzing statutes regulating reproductive biology). 
53. Law contrasts regulation concerning reproductive biology with legislation that reflects sex-
based classifications, such as those "based on what the government perceives to be the ability and 
willingness of certain citizens to care for children .... " Law, supra note 51, at 1034 (compariug 
statute requiring women to inform sexual partner of her pregnancy with statute providing child care 
leave to nursing mothers). 
54. Id. at 1008-09. 
55. Id. at 1002-13. Professor Law criticizes cases in which the Court relied on sex stereotypes 
of male aggression and male combat-readiness in order to underscore her view that attention to 
differences should be limited to laws implicating reproductive biology and to legislation which may 
negatively affect women. Id. at 1014 n.217. 
56. For further discussion of abortion-funding decisions, see id. at 985 n.15. 
57. See generally Finley, supra note 36, at 1159-63. 
58. Differences among the models then are best understood as little more than the use of 
varying means to accomplish similar objectives. Williams' insistence upon "pure" equality, for 
example, is principally based on her belief that special treatment accommodation will ultimately 
harm the social and economic status of women. See Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at 
196-97. Moreover, Williams believes that "pure" equality is within reach. See Williams, Equality's 
Riddle. supra note 39, at 380. For an examination of the "pure" version of equality, see Van Alstine, 
Rights of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979). 
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"formal comparative equality with its relatively more reliable stan-
dards. " 59 All three models, therefore, reflect the liberal vision that soci-
ety be built around rules equally applicable to men and women. Gender 
Justice, "[b]y opting for process over outcome, ... value[s] self-determi-
nation over collective determinations of sex roles" (p. 12). Equality the-
ory similarly speaks of "a commitment to a vision of the human 
condition which seeks to uncover commonalty rather than difference."60 
Finally, special treatment advocates claim that "where reproductive sex 
differences are not at issue ... one can compare women and men without 
distortion. " 61 
C. Inequality 
Inequality theory rejects the propositions that individual choice in 
the free market is the true measure of justice and that the private (home) 
and public (work) spheres are distinct. Inequality theorists consider 
these presumptions fuel for male-dominated norms which deny a distinct 
feminine identity and set "being like a man" as the outer bounds of a 
woman's potential. According to Lucinda Finley, "[t]he role of men in 
defining the standard of normalcy and in assigning significance to female 
differences, means that the whole premise of our equality jurisprudence is 
whatever is male is the norm."62 
Catherine MacKinnon is the leading proponent of the inequality 
model. She argues that the inequality approach "is marked by the under-
standing that sex discrimination is a system that defines women as infer-
ior from men, that cumnlatively disadvantages women for their 
59. Law, supra note 51, at 1012. 
60. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 39, at 326. 
61. Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 87. 
62. Finley, supra note 36, at 1155. Recent articles by Martha Minow, Ann Scales, Christine 
Littleton, and Robin West espouse a similar vision. Professor Minow argues that the work of 
leading feminists "exposes the dominance in field after field of conceptions of human nature that take 
a male as the reference point and treat women as 'other,' 'different,' 'deviant,' 'exceptional,' or 
baffling. Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both the use of 
male measures and the assumption that women fail by them." Minow, supra note 27, at 61 (footnote 
omitted). Professor Minow also notes that to avoid applying one particular view to stand for all 
women, feminists must also consider race and class in any account of gender relations. See id. at 63. 
For Professor Scales, the underlying philosophical basis of the legal system has "made maleness the 
norm of what is human, and [has done) so sub rosa, all in the name of neutrality." Scales, The 
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1377 (1986); see also id. at 1394 
(arguing that the law must focus on the effects of male domination rather than on the differences 
between the sexes). Professor West aptly summarizes this feminist critique: "The human being 
assumed or constituted by legal theory precludes the woman described by feminism." West, supra 
note 36, at 42. This is wrong. Echoing this perception, Professor Littleton argues that male 
domination-or "phallocentrism"-has "created a self-referencing system by which those things 
culturally identified as 'male' are more highly valued than those identified as 'female' .... " Littleton, 
supra note 36, at 1280. 
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differences from men, as well as ignores their similarities."63 Correla-
tively, she criticizes liberal visions, proclaiming that "it is not only lies 
and blindness that have kept women down. It is as much the social crea-
tion of differences, and the transformation of differences into social 
advantages and disadvantages, upon which inequality can rationally be 
predicated. "64 
This pervasiveness of male domination makes the application of 
rules impossible, for when the state "is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be 
most male; when it is most sex blind, it will be most blind to the sex of 
the standard being applied."65 Since neutrality and male dominance are 
inseparable, the liberal vision of choice is therefore impossible. Because 
of liberal transgressions, MacKinnon views as objectionable discrimina-
tion policies or practices that contribute to "the maintenance of an 
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status."66 
The inequality model likewise rejects liberal distinctions between 
public and private spheres. This rejection is best illustrated by Frances 
Olsen. 67 Claiming that this dichotomy treats "[a]ctual inequality and 
domination in the family . . . as private matters that the state did not 
bring about,"68 Professor Olsen argues that men have retained "exces-
sive" power both by restricting state regulation of the family and by 
using the state's coercive power "to reinforce and consolidate their 
63. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 116 (1979). For an excellent liberal critique of this book, see Taub, Book Review, 
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686 (1980). 
64. C. MACKINNON, supra note 63, at 105. 
65. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 
8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983). Similarly, Lucinda Finley argues that the absence of values such as 
interconnectedness and care in our system of rights reflects the male experience: 
It is the male aspect of human experience because men are generally removed from bodily 
concerns such as preparing food for the table and assuring clean clothes in the drawer, and 
have been removed from human experiences that can foster a sense of interconnectedness, 
such as birth and childrearing. Thus, it is much easier for men to conceive of themselves as 
disconnected, autonomous beings. 
Finley, supra note 36, at 1161. See also Freedman, supra note 21 (arguing that equality analysis, 
based upon perceived "natural" sex differences, is often used to uphold discriminating laws); Note, 
Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487, 495 (1981) ("the idea that sexual 
equality means assimilating women into the status quo [has) blocked the courts' view of changes in 
the status quo that might help make room for women"). 
66. C. MACKINNON, supra note 63, at 117. 
67. See Olsen, 17ze Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. 
L. REv. 1497 (1983). Olsen writes that "[t)he state as it now exists must be ended at the same time 
that civil society as it now exists is ended; and when we transform the contemporary family, we must 
simultaneously transform the market." Id. at 1568. See also Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on 
Women s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 117, 118-22 (D. Kairys ed. 
1982) (arguing that the limits the law places on female participation in the public sphere, coupled 
with the nearly complete absence of law in the private sphere, operates to promote male dominance 
in society); Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (rejecting 
separate-sphere approach because of historic state encroachment on the family). 
68. Olsen, supra note 67, at 1506. 
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authority over wives and children."69 Liberal solutions such as the 
recognition of marital property70 and no-fault divorce71 are considered 
inadequate to correct this power imbalance. Such solutions either "foster 
individual selfishness" or "legitimate actual inequality by individualizing 
and particularizing it."72 The solution, therefore, is not "to patch up and 
refine the liberal theory of the state," but to "challenge and disintegrate 
it."73 
Inequality theorists also offer a pragmatic critique of the liberal 
vision. For example, pointing to the competing cost-benefit framework 
of the equal treatment-special treatment debate, Lucinda Finley argues 
that both positions fail due to their reliance on the liberal doctrinal 
framework: "[T]he [liberal] theory of equality and the legal analysis that 
implements the theory cannot tell us how to define or identify what is a 
relevant difference and what is a relevant similarity in any given situa-
tion."74 Finley also argues that the liberal theorists' emphasis on auton-
omy limits reform, for the conception of detached autonomy as self-
definition "is challenged by the recoguition that our desires and values 
are often socially constructed."75 By focusing on the individual, there-
fore, the liberal vision gives short shrift to features of human develop-
ment emphasized by feminists. 
Inequality theory and the liberty-enhancing model advanced in Gen-
der Justice are clearly irreconcilable.76 Inequality writers view the liberal 
69. Id. at 1510. 
70. ld. at 1540. 
71. ld. at 1534. 
72. ld. at 1560. Compare Note, supra note 65, at 502 ("[l]f raising children and, say, drafting 
contracts were compensated equally (in money and status), women who will not or cannot adopt the 
typical male role of minimal parental responsibility would not be economically handicapped."). 
73. Olsen, supra note 67, at 1562. See also Finley, supra note 36, at 1163 ("A central aspect of 
the [gender hierarchy] problem that eludes equality analysis is the maintenance of separate spheres 
of work and horne ..•• "). It is also worth noting that feminist theorists are not the only group 
rejecting the liberal dichotomy between public and private spheres. The New Right, as Professor 
Law points out, seeks to replace this dichotomy with "a culturally and legally enforced ideal of the 
patriarchal family." Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law, 95 YALE L.J. 1769, 1778 
(1986). 
74. Finley, supra note 36, at 1149. 
75. Id. at 1161. 
76. Nevertheless, the sweeping rejection of liberalism by inequality theorists is probably overly 
broad. Liberalism takes on many forms, including some that at least potentially reject the notion 
that men and women are now ready to compete equally. John Rawls' emphasis on fair equality of 
opportunity, for example, recognizes that "those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and 
have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their 
initial place in the social system .... " J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF Jus·ncE 73 (1971). According to 
Rawls, "[t]he consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity requires us to view persons 
independently from the influences of their social position." Id. at 511. If fair outcomes are 
predicated on the existence of a fair process, then inequalities that influence social position must be 
taken into account. While admitting that Rawls himself has only "barely hinted at" applying his 
theories to feminist jurisprudence, Susan Okin has argued that "a consistent and wholehearted 
HeinOnline -- 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1392 1988
1392 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1377 
definition of choice and the separation between public and private 
spheres as male constructs and sources of male domination. For inequal-
ity writers, "[t]he liberal humanist goal of protecting 'the untrammelled 
exercise of capacities central to human rationality' not only does not 
apply to disenabled persons, but often requires the systematic deprivation 
of the freedom of others.'m Kirp, Yudof, and Franks dismiss this view-
point as failing to attribute to women any significant role in shaping their 
environment (p. 63). In advancing the liberty-enhancing model, they 
make this classic liberal argument: "By opting for our own plan of life 
rather than imaginiug it imposed on us, we engage in a uniquely human 
enterprise that expresses our moral dignity" (p. 64). Needless to say, this 
formulation does not sit well with inequality visionaries. They see this 
formulation as problematic in a world where, they maintain, the individ-
ual will is often shaped by social conditioning and context. 
III 
GENDER JUSTICE AND ITS CRITICS 
Scholarly criticism of Gender Justice must be understood in its con-
text. The ferocity of the book's critics derives in large part from their 
rejection of the book's acceptance of the liberal vision. Lucinda Finley/8 
Sarah Burns/9 and Carrie Menkel-Meadow80 assess the book in a man-
ner often analogous to the inequality model's critique of liberalism. 
James Fishkin argues that the authors' complete faith in the process 
approach cannot be justified when these procedures produce systematic 
patterns of unequal outcomes. 81 For the most part, these criticisms fail 
to evaluate Gender Justice's actual application of the liberty-enhancing 
model, but concentrate instead on criticizing the model itself. Indeed, 
much of the criticism of Gender Justice concerns the book that the 
authors should have written rather than the one that they did write. It is 
thus important to explore how the reviewers approach gender issues 
from a perspective different from Gender Justice's authors. 
The inequality-based critiques consider Gender Justice analytically 
application of Rawls' liberal principles can lead us to challenge fundamentally the gender system of 
our society." Okin, Justice and Gender, 16 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 42,44 (1987). Rawls is not the only 
liberal who deviates from inequality theorists' caricature of liberalism. See S. HOLMES, BENJAMIN 
CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 3, 241-61 (1984) (arguing that Constant's 
ideas are not injured by criticisms of liberalism's emphasis on private rights and blindness to social 
context); Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory (Book Review), 101 HARV. L. REv. 826, 835 n.39 
(1988) (criticizing MacKinnon's remarks about liberalism as "too casual" because she identifies all 
of liberalism with the ideas of a narrow aspect of that school of thought). 
77. Scales, supra note 62, at 1389 (footnote omitted). 
78. Finley, supra note 4. 
79. Burns, supra note 3. 
80. Menkei-Meadow, supra note 6. 
81. Fishkin, supra note 5. 
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flawed because it emphasizes decontextualized autonomy. According to 
these writers, the book fails to recogniZe that gender roles and other soci-
etal pressures greatly affect the significance of choice. 82 For example, 
Professor Finley argues that a truly free society requires "far more than 
refrain[ing] from interfering with existing 'choices' that grow out of the 
currently prevailing power structure, roles, and expectations of our soci-
ety."83 Professor Bums similarly criticizes the book for its failure to rec-
ognize pervasive discrimination in society's distribution of resources and 
opportunities: "At home and at work, by embedded cultural meanings 
and practices, women generally are secondary to men."84 Finally, for 
Professor Menkel-Meadow Gender Justice and its liberty-enhancing 
model fall back on "several old, liberal, middle-class, white, and male 
saws-choice, 'equal liberty,' individualism, process, freedom, and 
autonomy .... " 85 
Inequality-based critiques thus reject Gender Justice's reliance on 
free choice as the source of reform. Professor Menkel-Meadow points to 
actual social conditions that formnlate choices, and asks, "Can a woman 
who does not have sufficient education to 'freely choose' between Ameri-
can achievement on the job and traditional familial socialization to get 
married, have children, and stay home really be considered as having 
expressed a choice?"86 Indeed, both Menkel-Meadow and Finley 
recount personal experiences that illustrate problems with Gender Jus-
tice's concept of choice. Professor Menkel-Meadow discusses a woman 
in her exercise class having a breast enlargement "because to her hus-
band and to herself she was 'nothing' with her small breasts. "87 Profes-
sor Finley speaks of a friend's young daughter "already attuned to the 
dangers and difficulties of breaking out of conventional social roles" in 
her desire to be a stewardess and not a pilot. 88 Professor Fishkin, while 
not explicitly endorsing the inequality model, also criticizes Gender Jus-
tice for its reliance on choice. He argues that because women operate at 
such a disadvantage, choice is illusory and outcomes must be scrutinized 
to ensure fair process. 89 
Menkel-Meadow and Finley also disavow Gender Justice's endorse-
ment of the public-private distinction. As Menkel-Meadow asserts, 
82. Finley, supra note 4, at 940-41. 
83. Id. at 943; see also id. at 923 ("Is there any role in the liberty theory for moral outrage over 
•.. the many other indignities faced by women?"). 
84. Burns, supra note 3, at 1795; see also id. at 1794 (criticizing the authors' adherence to the 
liberal model despite the conflicting goal of "achieving genuine gender equality"). 
85. Menkei-Meadow, supra note 6, at 259. 
86. Id. at 265. 
87. Id. 
88. Finley, supra note 4, at 932 n.87. 
89. See Fishkin, supra note 5, at 1448-49. 
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"[w]hat well-schooled feminist aspires to a government policy that per-
petuates sharp market-family distinctions and leaves individuals 'free' to 
do as they will, in a present world largely constructed out of past 'official' 
policies which largely pre-ordain those 'choices'?"90 Given this view of 
reality, Finley advocates the attainment of fundamental political and 
social change through "[g]lobal attention to the intricate interweavings 
of family, market, and politics ... .''91 
The debunking of liberal thinking-rather than an assessment of 
Gender Justice within the context of liberal ideology-is the raison d'etre 
of all four reviews. Professor Menkel-Meadow recommends the book, 
"but only if you want to see where you belong in a world constructed by 
a limited liberal vision."92 Professor Burns is pained by the authors' fail-
ure to consider adequately contemporary feminist thinkers, and argues 
that such consideration might have made the authors' own analysis 
"more thoughtful and self-aware.''93 Professor Finley likewise finds fault 
with the book because it "seems barely touched by the recent profusion 
of feminist writings on gender issues."94 Professor Fishkin's review, 
meanwhile, presents a summary critique of the book's process-based 
liberalism. 95 
Gender Justice is criticized for two generalizations that set the tone 
of its analysis: I) the liberty-enhancing model is sufficient to overcome 
past discrimination because "[r]ules governing the conduct of women 
were adopted in what was honestly seen as women's best interest" (p. 
30); and 2) the "leftist feminist" theory is too deterministic to contribute 
to the liberty-enhancing model (p. 48). Finley criticizes these proposi-
tions because she believes that a theory of gender justice must include 
"analysis of the ways in which women are oppressed [in order to under-
stand] how the options, choices, and dignity of women have been system-
atically constrained by their powerless positions throughout history.''96 
That a book is either incomplete in its consideration of a topic or 
inadequate to the task of drawing meaning from some phenomenon cer-
tainly are appropriate grounds for criticism.97 Gender Justice's critics do 
90. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 260; see also Burns, supra note 3, at 1797 (arguing that 
women's individual autonomy and ability to make free choices is impaired in a culture that often 
places them in precarious economic circumstances). 
91. Finley, supra note 4, at 918. 
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 272. 
93. Burns, supra note 3, at 1816; see also id. at 1793 n.9 (criticizing Gender Justice's failure to 
discuss feminist interpretations of Supreme Court sex discrimination cases). 
94. Finley, supra note 4, at 915. 
95. See Fishkin, supra note 5, at 1445-50. 
96. Finley, supra note 4, at 934. 
97. Indeed, I have written critical reviews along these lines. See Devins, Defining Effective 
Civil Rights Enforcement in Education, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1986) (reviewing M. REDELL & 
A. BLOCK, EQUALITY AND EDUCATION (1985)); Devins, Centralization in Education: Why Joilnny 
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more than this, however. By portraying the book as an exemplar of liber-
alism's larger failure, Gender Justice's fate is effectively sealed from the 
start. Since repudiation of the liberal vision underlies much of contem-
porary feminist thought, it is understandable that Gender Justice pro-
vokes strong negative feelings.98 
This is not to say that Gender Justice is a perfect book-far from it. 
Many of the criticisms leveled at the book attack not only the premises of 
the authors' model, but also its application. As revealed by the discus-
sion in the balance of this Part, some of these narrow criticism$ are 
poignant.99 
The narrow criticisms of Gender Justice are mostly directed at the 
authors' approval of various gender-specific classifications. For example, 
the authors argue that in some instances sex-segregated public schools 
are justified because they "afford a richer mix of choices to everyone" 
(pp. 106-07). However, Bums argues that dramatic differences in the 
quality of education and prestige of diplomas exist at such schools. 100 
Similarly, Finley criticizes Gender Justice's apparent approval of differ-
ential disability benefits for "voluntary" pregnancy as "entrench[ing] the 
stereotypical and choice-constraining views of women's place in the 
home."101 Finally, Bums contends that the authors' endorsement of dif-
ferential retirement ages for men and women under the Social Security 
Act (pp. 1 02-03) fails to search out less gender-specific altematives. 102 
The reviewers also criticize Gender Justice's recognition of actual 
sex differences. For example, while the authors feel that differences 
between men's and women's life expectations justify sex-based differences 
in pension and life insurance plans (p. 114), critics note that reduced 
pension payments unfairly constrain the choices of retired women. 103 
Likewise, integrating women into the workforce may adversely affect 
Can't Spell Bureaucracy, (Book Review), 75 CALIF. L. REv. 759 (1987) (reviewing D. KIRP & D. 
JENSEN, SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION 
(1986)). 
98. Not only does the book espouse liberalism, but also it understates feminist concerns and 
approves of various sex-based classifications in the name of natural differences and administrative 
convenience. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
99. These reviews, on rare occasion; note meritorious features of the book. Professor Menkel-
Meadow describes as "generally laudable" the book's advocacy of "government support of many 
different family forms." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 270. Professor Bums also supports some 
of the book's analysis and proposals. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1793 n.15 (praising the authors for, 
among other things, "insightful" criticism of Justice Rehnquist's gender decisions). 
100. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1801-04. Bums' disagreement with the authors on this issue is 
ultimately over priorities: "Excusing such sex segregation, with the explanation that the motivation 
for it is to preserve educational 'choice' or 'diversity,' is to decide that separation of the sexes is more 
important than affording full access to quality education regardless of sex." 1d. at 1804. 
101. Finley, supra note 4, at 929. 
102. Bums, supra note 3, at 1806-08. 
103. Finley, supra note 4, at 925. 
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their life expectancy.104 Thus, the reviewers ridicule Gender Justice for 
"discounting" women's changing social status105 by imposing another 
generation's social roles on today's working women. Correlatively, crit-
ics attack the authors' acceptance of administrative convenience as a jus-
tification for sex-based classifications, such as the military's previous 
practice of automatically giving wives of servicemen dependents' benefits, 
while requiring the husbands of servicewomen to prove dependency. 106 
As Finley wryly observes, "[i]t is surprising that such strong individual-
ists as the authors are not more suspicious about the use of statistical 
generalizations that treat women as a class."107 
Finally, Gender Justice is criticized for resorting to arguments 
beyond the scope of the liberty-enhancing model in order to avoid 
reforms. For example, Finley notes that the authors' rejection of compa-
rable worth is premised on their wariness of the accuracy of job evalua-
tion systems, a position that has little to do with their liberty principle. 108 
Such wariness is characterized as "hostility towards the transformation 
of values and roles that is the deeper aspiration of the comparable worth 
movement." 109 
This sense of distrust and perceived hostility connects the narrow 
criticisms of the book with the reviewers' broader complaints of liber-
alism's failure. For the reviewers, the combination of the authors' appli-
cation of the liberty-enhancing model with their depiction of feminists as 
"leftist" and "result oriented" (pp. 48-53) is too much. The reviewers 
are not content merely to criticize Kirp, Yudof, and Franks as "bad" 
liberals. Their attacks, instead, are designed to expose liberalism's nearly 
inevitable support of the male-dominated status quo. The principal tar-
get of these reviewers then is the liberal model itself, not its application 
by Kirp, Yudof, and Frank. 
IV 
AsSESSING GENDER JUSTICE 
Gender Justice is an important, worthwhile, and flawed book. By 
providing a literate, fast-moving, and thoughtful overview of an incredi-
104. See id. at 926; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 268 (noting that life expectancy is 
not completely uncontrollable). 
105. Finley, supra note 4, at 926. 
106. See Bums, supra note 3, at 1809-10 (stating that the authors' emphasis on efficiency-based 
distinctions is incompatible with "equal liberty"); see also Finley, supra note 4, at 924-25 (arguing 
that such regulations invade the privacy-and thus liberty-of servicewomen by forcing them to 
submit their family economic affairs to public scrutiny). 
107. Finley, supra note 4, at 925. 
108. !d. at 928. 
109. ld.; see alsq Bums, supra note 3, at 1812 (suggesting that the authors' rejection of job-
evaluation systems places "the cost and burden of overcoming historic discrimination entirely on 
women"). 
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ble range of issues, the book serves as an excellent primer on gender jus-
tice. The authors' provocative applications of the liberty-enhancing 
model encourage the reader to think through the issues (and even disa-
gree with the authors). Their account of the causes of gender segregation 
and their assessments of feminist thinking and the economic status of 
women present a lively point of comparison for the reader. Also, 
through its insistence that the liberty-enhancing model applies equally to 
men and women, the book offers a new perspective on the concept of 
gender justice. 110 
Gender Justice does have three principal shortcomings, however. 
First, in applying their free-choice model, the authors' calculus often 
seems ill-founded. Second, their embrace of liberalism is not entirely 
consistent. Finally, the authors fail to address adequately feminist think-
ing and the separation between public and private spheres. Discussion of 
such issues as the Equal Rights Amendment, the rights of homosexuals, 
and antipornography legislation would improve the book's comprehen-
siveness in this regard. This Part considers the significance of each of 
these shortcomings. 
A. Ill-founded Calculations 
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' application of their liberty-enhancing 
model does not always seem reasonable. This is especially the case in 
those instances where the authors approve of sex segregation. Critics of 
the book are therefore correct in questioning the authors' approval of sex 
segregation in education, pension payments, and pregnancy-related disa-
bility. 111 Such segregation does not enhance choice; it limits it. Sex seg-
regation in education, as Sarah Burns and others have shown, may well 
constrain or foreclose opportunities to enter select fields of employ-
ment. 112 Disparities in pension payments, as Lucinda Finley has argued, 
improperly presume that women's changing role in the work force will 
not affect life expectancies. 113 Finally, pregnancy-related disability-
110. Gender Justice, while broadening the focus of the sex equality issue, pays little attention to 
the manner in which males seek to assume traditionally female roles. For example, men have been 
somewhat successful in challenging laws which-for the purposes of custody determinations-view 
women as primary caretakers. For more comprehensive treatments of this issue, see Law, supra note 
51, at 987-1002 {discussing Supreme Court decisions reviewing laws that discriminate against men); 
Kay, Models of Equality, supra note 48, at 69-70 (discussing sex discrimination suits brought by 
men). 
11 I. See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text. 
112. Bums, supra note 3, at 1800-05. 
113. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. Finley observes: 
If a retired woman receives less in pension payments each month than the man she worked 
alongside for an equal number of years, isn't her liberty being constrained in relation to 
his? ... To say that she may live longer than her male co-worker, and thus may receive the 
same or more over the long run is no answer to the choice-constraining standard-of-living 
problem .... 
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while perhaps not entitled to special beneficent treatment114-clearly 
should not be singled out for unfavorable treatment. Whether or not 
pregnancy is voluntary, it is a condition that limits a woman's 
opportunities. 
Gender Justice does not hinge on such calculations, however. Kirp, 
Yudof, and Franks freely admit that the liberty-enhancing model is sub-
ject to variable application, dependent in part on one's values and other 
circumstances surrounding a particular issue. For example, in their 
assessment of military dependents' benefits, the authors are unable to 
determine whether administrative convenience or sexual stereotyping 
concerns should prevail (pp. 114-15). The linchpin of this ambivalence is 
that the military's sexist presumption may be "almost universally true" 
(p. 115). This particular calculation is troubling; it is disingenuous to 
suggest that the sex-stereotyping of women as secondary wage earners 
can secure "fair processes rather than particular outcomes" (p. 12). Nev-
ertheless, value-based variability in results is not inherently bothersome. 
Many other situations can be imagined in which thoughtful people 
would disagree as to whether a particular outcome furthers or under-
mines gender equality. For example, although the court in the Baby M 
litigation declared surrogacy contracts void, 115 one may argue that disal-
lowing such contracts improperly denies women the ability to earn 
money through such endeavors. Yet enforcing such contracts creates an 
irrebuttable presumption that the child's best interests cannot be served 
by a custody decision favoring the mother. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' 
proposal is not the only one that raises the spectre of inconsistent appli-
cation. Sylvia Law's and Catherine MacKinnon's proposals both hinge 
on determinations of what is oppressive to women-determinations that 
are often subjective and unclear. Indeed, any proposal not hinged to a 
fixed rule (for example, gender distinctions are always pernicious) is nec-
essarily subject to varying application. 
Critics should not focus too much attention on the authors' use of 
the liberty-enhanciqg model. Their calibrations are best understood as a 
device to think through the application of the free-choice model and not 
as distinct social policy proposals. In fact, because Gender Justice 
advances a comprehensive methodology, the authors need not produce 
overwhelming evidence demonstrating the soundness of each recommen-
dation. The authors can instead move from issue to issue, concerned 
only that they frame the question in accordance with their analytical 
model. 
The authors' methodology serves Gender Justice well. Their 
Finley, supra note 4, at 925. 
114. See generally supra notes 47-61. 
115. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
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detailed application of the free-choice model leaves the reader with sub-
stantially more than an abstract moral imperative. Furthermore, using 
this latitude, the book highlights the range of issues that define gender 
justice. As stated in the introduction, "Because gender influences so 
many aspects of our lives, policies that ostensibly aren't about gender at 
all nonetheless have evident relevance" (p. 1). 
The broad focus of Gender Justice is a breakthrough, for concep-
tions of gender inequality have changed dramatically. Consider the fol-
lowing: Prior to December 1977, t4e Social Security Act demanded that 
men-but not women-seeking spousal benefits demonstrate dependency 
on their wage earner wives for one-half of their support. 116 Whom did 
this classification injure, the surviving male spouse who was denied bene-
fits or put through an additional procedural obstacle, or the female wage 
earner whose income provided less protection to her family than that of 
her husbandJ117 The answer, of course, is that the classification injured 
both. The couple's relationship is symbiotic, and thus, so must be the 
effect of the Act. With 23 million households now dependent on the 
earnings of working wives, 118 the life choices of both men and women are 
greatly affected by women's access to traditionally male-dominated pro-
fessions, as well as pregnancy leave, day care, pay equity, and a range of 
other issues. Consequently, gender equality is no longer solely a question 
116. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984). 
117. See Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of 
Heckler v. Mathews, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1985). 
118. See Fader, Men Lose Freedom if Women Lose Ground, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 22, col. 
3 (discussing benefits to men married to women with salaried jobs). This fact, of course, does not 
mean that wage parity exists between men and women. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks recognize the wage 
gap, noting that "in several critical respects, women are not men's equal in the marketplace" and 
that in addition to the exercise of choice, "[d]iscrimination is at work in the creation of the wage 
gap" (pp. 144-45). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE 
FOR THE SO's (1984) (discussing wage gap and comparable worth doctrine); Hantzis, Is Gender 
Justice a Completed Agenda? (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 690 (1987) (discussing condition 
of women in the marketplace). 
The adequacy of liberal antidiscrimination measures is the remaining question. Kirp, Yudof, 
and Franks feel these measures are sufficient (p. 172). However, proponents of comparable worth 
and statistical measures of discrimination disagree. See Hartman, Pay Equity for Women: Wage 
Discrimination and the Comparable Worth Controversy in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS 167 (R. Fullinwider & C. Mills eds. 1986); Finley, supra note 4, at 937-40 (discussing 
statistical proofs of discrimination). 
Comparable worth is significant on another level. Feminists critical of the current liberal model 
are divided on this issue. For example, Catherine MacKinnon apparently rejects comparable worth 
reforms. As divined by Cass Sunstein in her analysis of MacKinnon's work: "By increasing salaries 
in traditional female jobs, comparable worth remedies might reinforce women's preferences for those 
jobs or distort the employment market." Sunstein, supra note 76, at 838. In contrast, Christine 
Littleton argues that "[e]quality as acceptance makes the broad[] claim that all behavioral forms 
that the culture (not just the employer) has encoded as 'male' and 'female' counterparts should be 
equally rewarded." Littleton, supra note 36, at 1312. 
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of women's rights. 119 Instead, the focus must be on the status of both 
men and women, and on the existence of artificially imposed distinctions 
between them. 
Gender Justice's critics find its broad methodology troublesome. 
Noting that outcomes are determined by "what factors are selected for 
emphasis and who is evaluating the relative strengths of the respective 
liberties," Finley argues that the liberty-enhancing model may "simply 
be an invitation for the perspective and preferences of the traditionally 
powerful to triumph once again." 1~0 This criticism is similar to inequal-
ity theorists' contention that liberalism is not value-neutral, but in fact 
presupposes and perpetuates male-dominated norms. 121 In other words, 
this criticism is not so much about the book as about liberalism. 
Liberals are willing to risk such unjust application either because 
they believe that the locus of decisionmaking is properly lodged in the 
individual122 or because they fear that special treatment will ultimately 
prove harmful to the benefited class. 123 Moreover, the proposals of ine-
quality feminists are equally fraught with the danger of subjective appli-
cation. 124 For example, in urging such a standard of review Professor 
MacKinnon fails to appreciate that the "determination of what rein-
forces or undermines a sex-based underclass is exceedingly difficult." 125 
Consider the cases of Kahn v. Shevin, 126 upholding a small tax 
exemption for widows as compensation for past discrimination, and 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 127 allowing Navy servicewomen more time than 
their male counterparts to seek a promotion due to their exclusion from 
119. In a series of cases dealing with unwed fathers, the Supreme Court has ruled that such men 
must "earn" their custodial rights. Distinguishing between "a mere biological relationship and an 
actual relationship of parental responsibility," the Court has held that the "significance of the 
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity no other male possesses to 
develop a relationship with his offspring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60, 262 (1983). 
Consequently, irrebuttable presumptions denying an unwed father any right to custody once the 
mother dies are invalid, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as are laws which deny to an unwed 
father (but not an unwed mother) veto power over his child's adoption. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 
U.S. 380 (1979). On the other hand, statutes which place substantial obstacles in front of an unwed 
father are permissible. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (unwed father need not possess 
absolute veto power over adoption); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (unwed father must comply with 
state procedures to preserve right to object to adoption). Gender Justice would benefit from a 
discussion of this body of case law. See supra note 110. 
120. Finley, supra note 4, at 931; see also id. at 924 (arguing that what is liberty-enhancing 
depends upon the outcome desired). 
121. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
123. See, e.g., Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra note 28, at 196-97 (summarizing 
disadvantages of the special treatment model in the context of pregnancy and maternity policy). 
124. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
125. Law, supra note 51, at 1005; see also Taub, supra note 63, at 1691 (criticizing MacKinnon 
on these grounds). 
126. 416 u.s. 351 (1974). 
127. 419 u.s. 498 (1975). 
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sea duty. Professor MacKinnon lauds these decisions for implicitly rec-
ognizing that sex discrimination cumulatively penalizes women based on 
their differences from men. 128 Yet, as Nadine Taub has recognized, these 
decisions can be criticized "because the crude brand of compensation 
they purport to offer women is both inadequate and a distraction from 
the real problems women face." 129 Moreover, Taub has suggested, and 
MacKinnon must recognize, that it is exceedingly unlikely that a suppos-
edly male-dominated court system can successfully apply MacKinnon's 
suggested standard of review. 130 
Gender Justice's miscalculations, while disappointing, do not under-
mine the liberty-enhancing model. The critical question is whether, 
given a liberal model, its proposal offers a useful approach to reducing 
gender injustice. The validity of liberalism itself is not a question that 
Gender Justice purports to answer (p. 4). The book presupposes that the 
liberal model, with its emphasis on autonomy, is appropriate. 
B. Gender Justice and the Liberal Vision 
The authors' emphasis on the benevolence of male domination and 
its concomitant delineation of racial and gender justice raises doubts 
about the book's fidelity to the liberal vision. Presumably, if the authors' 
perception that sex segregation is rooted in paternalism were shaken, 
they instead might advocate an interventionist strategy. 
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks argue that "women were victimized by 
policies designed to protect them-policies that, for this very reason, 
denied them the chance to make basic decisions for themselves" (p. 
29). 131 Although this vision is highly critical, the authors incorrectly 
conclude that the husband-wife relationship is analogous to parent-child, 
not owner-slave. While laws affecting a woman's earnings and working 
conditions can be justified as beneficent paternalism, 132 many other gen-
128. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 63, at 116-17. 
129. Taub, supra note 63, at 1692. 
130. Id. at 1691-92. 
131. As this part will demonstrate, the authors are clearly mistaken in suggesting that benelicent 
paternalism is the source of sex segregation. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137. The 
obviousness of this mistake is bothersome. It suggests that the liberty-enhancing approach is 
premised on an optimistic assessment of women's present condition. At this level, the liberty-
enhancing model can be criticized as little more than a smoke screen for a diminished governmental 
role in addressing gender issues. I believe that Gender Justice's critics would argue that the authors' 
conclusion that most sex discrimination was "benevolent" illustrates their inability to develop an 
acceptable theory of gender justice. My view is somewhat different. I strongly feel that the authors 
are truly committed in principle to their liberty-enhancing model. For me, their line drawing 
between race and gender discrimination, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, is best 
understood as a tacit recognition that as applied the liberty-enhancing model is subject to attack. 
132. Some evidence even suggests that there is reason to question the beneficence of protective 
labor legislation. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE LAW 247-68 (1975) (discussing actual negative effects of such legislation). 
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der-specific classifications are not amenable to such justification. Under 
the common law, where divorce was impossible, the wife was always her 
husband's chattel. I33 The children of the relationship were always to be 
in the father's custody (p. 184), I34 the husband controlled the domicile 
(pp. 177-78), and, if the wife was involved in an adulterous relationship, 
the husband could sue her lover for infringing on his property rights to 
her fidelity. I35 
Differences between husband-wife and parent-child relationships are 
also exemplified by the conflicting legal standards governing marital rape 
and child abuse. As of 1984, forty states retained some form of marital 
exemption for rape. I36 These laws derive from the common law notion 
that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon 
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the 
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she can-
not retract."137 In sharp contrast, laws that allow the state to take cus-
tody of children date back to the sixteenth century.I38 These laws, first 
enacted in this country in the nineteenth century, are grounded in the (7 
state's parens patriae authority to ensure a certain modicum of care in the 
upbringing of children. I39 This power presumes both an independent 
state interest in the well-being of children and that the right to parental 
custody may be limited by the child's age and the nature of parental care. 
I do not contend that the husband-wife relationship is analogous to 
that of owner-slave. But beneficent paternalism is an inadequate justifi-
cation for differing theories of justice for women and racial minorities. 
Moreover, since Gender Justice claims that justice ensures fair processes 
rather than particular outcomes, it is unclear why the authors' analysis of 
gender issues varies significantly from their approach to race. Consider-
133. See generally Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School 
Curriculum, and Developments Towards Equality. 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1972) (discussing 
unequal treatment of married women). 
134. See Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688-91 (Ala. 1981) (describing evolution of gender-
based presumptions affecting custody). 
135. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 654-60 (1930) 
(discussing the tort of "criminal conversation"); Kavanagh, Alienation of Affection and Criminal 
Conversation: Unholy Matrimony in Need of Annulment. 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 323 (1981) (discussing 
torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affection). 
136. See generally Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption From Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 VT. L. 
REv. 33 (1982). 
137. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 162,474 N.E.2d 567,572,485 N.Y.S.2d 207,212 (1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985) (quoting 1 HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629). 
Protecting marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation are the contemporary justifications. I d. at 
165, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214. 
138. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role In 
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases. 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 894-910 (1975) (summarizing history of child 
neglect laws). 
139. See Devins, A Constitutional Right to Home Instruction?, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 435, 443-56 
(1984). 
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ing the authors' firm opposition to quotas (p. 136)140 and their support of 
both process-based affirmative action (recruitment, training) (pp. 134-35) 
and the vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws (p. 153), their 
visions of gender and racial justice should be parallel. The authors' sug-
gestion that they are building upon a conception of justice therefore 
seems misleading. Instead, because the authors build their proposal 
around the "beneficent" character of gender classifications, varying con-
ceptions of women's status-not visions of justice-explain the principal 
differences between Gender Justice and the naturalist and feminist per-
spectives it criticizes. 
C. Comprehensiveness 
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks forthrightly acknowledge in their intro-
duction that their "aim is to test an argument and not to produce an 
encyclopedia; along the way, some matters of substantive importance 
undoubtedly receive short shrift" (p. 4). This is true in light of Gender 
Justice's failure to give fuller treatment to failed efforts to ratify the equal 
rights amendment and the controversy over antipornography legislation. 
These issues, in varying ways, reflect divisions both within the feminist 
community and between feminist and nonfeminist women. 
Recent studies of the ERA demonstrate that conflict between femi-
nists and homemakers was a principal cause of the amendment's 
demise. 141 Recognition of these studies would bolster Gender Justice's 
conclusion that choice plays a large role in understanding women's social 
status. 
Discussion of the antipornography debate also would fit nicely in 
the book. This debate sets inequality feminists, who view pornography 
as part of "the power of men over women in society,"142 against civil 
libertarians and equality feminists. 143 On this issue, inequality feminists 
live up to their deterministic caricature by advocating "[t]he paternalistic 
notion that women can never freely consent to pose for sexually explicit 
pictures or films." 144 In an ironic twist, antipornography efforts also fit 
the interventionist naturalist caricature, for such legislation has been 
140. For the authors, "quotas withhold from individuals the right of self-determination that is 
critical for self-respect" (p. 136). 
141. J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE Losr THE ERA 98-112, 216 (1986). See generally Rhode, 
Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (1983). 
142. C. MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 5; see also Sunstein, supra note 74, at 840-46 (describing 
and assessing MacKinnon's writings on pornography). 
143. See WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (V. Burstyn ed. 1985); see also Shrossen, The 
Convergence of Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles in the Pornography Debate (Book Review), 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987). 
144. Shrossen, supra note 143, at 210. 
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championed by those who wish to " 'restore ladies to what they used to 
be.' ,14s 
Gender Justice could also have been enhanced by discussing the 
rights of homosexuals. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
such as antisodomy statutes and the prohibition of homosexual mar-
riages, deserves mention because it raises the fundamental question of 
what role-if any-social norms should play in limiting the free-choice 
model. 146 Although such an exploration necessarily raises knotty issues, 
the sweep and risks of free-choice requires such a full exploration. 
Otherwise, the many guideposts set up by the application of the free-
choice model are not fully instructive. 
More troubling is the authors' failure to recognize the difficulties of 
maintaining a public-private distinction. While the authors recognize 
both the breadth of gender policy and that "[t]he boundary between pub-
lic and private is blurred" (p. 17), they fail to consider whether the sepa-
ration of public and private spheres makes sense when the state controls 
the intimate details of family life. Until twenty years ago, domestic rela-
tions laws were exclusively based on sexual stereotypes. For example, 
there was a presumption in favor of maternal custody, 147 courts could 
award alimony only to the wife, 148 and unwed fathers had no parental 
rights. 149 
The evolution of equal protection and due process review has under-
mined some of the force of such presumptions. Yet marriage and family 
remain essentially state-sanctioned relationships. 150 In fact, in cases lim-
iting the scope of the spousal testimonial privilege151 and rejecting a 
requirement of spousal consent to abortion, 152 the Supreme Court did 
not base its decisions on the rights of a spouse as an individual. 153 
Instead, the Court emphasized that, before limiting the spousal testimo-
145. Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False Promises: Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the 
U.S., in WoMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 143, at 133 (quoting legislative sponsor of 
antipornography bill). 
146. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted (holding 
that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis); cf. Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute). 
147. See supra note 134. 
148. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding such laws unconstitutional). 
149. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding statutory denial of hearing on fitness 
to unwed fathers unconstitutional). 
150. For a defense of preferred legal status for-and insulation of-marriage, see Hafen, The 
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: Balancing the Individual and Social 
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983). 
151. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that witness spouse alone can 
assert privilege to refuse to testify). 
152. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1978). 
153. The Court in Danforth nevertheless recognized that concern for the pregnant woman's 
right of privacy supported its rnling. /d. at 70 n.ll. 
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nial privilege, the marriage must be in such disrepair that it is beyond 
preservation. 154 This notion also underlies contemporary no-fault 
divorce, where-in theory--divorce is awarded only if the state is con-
vinced that the marriage is irreparable. 155 
The question of where to draw the line separating public from pri-
vate concerns still remains. 156 Of course, one can reject-as inequality 
feminists do-the drawing of such lines. 157 Gender Justice's liberty-
enhancing model avoids this issue. While we are told that sex-based pre-
sumptions governing custody and domicile are improper {pp. 183-86), 
that settlement agreements should be used in the dissolution of marriage 
{p. 183), and that husbands shonld have some voice in the abortion deci-
sion {p. 111), the book never relates these concerns to some larger con-
ception of the public and private spheres. Although the authqrs argue 
that the spheres should remain separate, they never confront the com-
plexity and pervasiveness of this disjunction. 
Finally, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks err in describing feminist thinking 
in sweeping terms. Perhaps, for their purposes, such an approach made 
sense because they sought merely to explain that by rejecting the liberal 
model, leftist feminists must embrace deterministic government interven-
tion {pp. 48-61). By mischaracterizing feminist thought, however, the 
authors touched a nerve in the feminist community, as evidenced by the 
highly critical reviews attacking the book on this count. 158 This resnlt 
was unfortunate for it has obscured the debate over the many important 
issues raised by the book. 
CONCLUSION 
Gender Justice, despite its limitations, is a worthwhile contribution 
to gender jurisprudence. Its broad view of gender-based policy frees the 
reader from the traditional equation of gender policy with women's 
rights. Using the liberty-enhancing model, Gender Justice offers salient 
information and insights on an unexpectedly wide range of significant 
policy questions. Granted, the book does not fulfill its promise of 
advancing a theory of justice. But, when viewed as a starting point for 
154. "When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-
whatever the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in 
the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52. 
155. See THE 1966 REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR'S CoMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, reprinted in J. 
AREEN, FAMILY LAW 267-70 (2d ed. 1985). For an analysis of the detrimental impact of no-fault 
divorce and other reforms on women's economic status, see L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION 15-51 (1985). 
156. See generally Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and 
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982) (comparing political support for the 
dichotomy with legal scholarship challenging its legitimacy). 
157. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text. 
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understanding gender-based policy, Gender Justice admirably serves its 
purpose. 
It is unfortunate that reviewers have used the book as a vehicle to 
attack liberal thinking. 159 Admittedly, Gender Justice invites such criti-
cism through trivialization .of feminist thinking and its approval of some 
sex-based classifications. But Gender Justice should not be judged solely 
on the applications of its liberty-enhancing model. It is intended as an 
opening round in a dialogue, not as a be-ali-and-end-all to thinking on 
this subject. Ironically, the very ferocity of its critics may ultimately fur-
ther the book's purpose by drawing attention to Gender Justice and the 
debate about sexual equality. 
159. In suggesting that Gender Justice has been treated unfairly, I do not mean to insinuate-by 
way of contrast-that critics have widely praised the works of inequality feminists. Catherine 
MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified, for example, has been subject to fairly critical review. See 
Bartlett, supra note 36, at 1566 ("MacKinnon's faith in some authentic reality of womanhood that 
will emerge once women have thrown off the yoke of male domination is in direct contradiction to 
her heavy reliance upon the role of social construction in explaining male hegemony."). Even 
authors sympathetic to MacKinnon's views find some deficiencies in her analysis. See, e.g., Colker, 
Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U.L. 
REV. 217, 250 (1988) ("MacKinnon [improperly] discounts descriptions of [women's] freedom but 
not subordination"); Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on 
Feminism Unmodified, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 352, 379-80 (1988) (MacKinnon "overlooks the 
incredible strength, and creative ability to nurture hope ... that women have displayed throughout 
history."); Sunstein, supra note 76, at 830 (criticizing a generally praiseworthy book for relying on 
"discussion [that] is sometimes too polemieal"). 
